Charles Siewert
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19. “Is the Appearance of Shape Protean?”

Publications

 Psyche 12 (3) July 2006

 

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Charles Siewert:
Robert Alan and Kathryn Dunlevie Hayes Professor of Humanities and Professor of Philosophy at Rice University

© 2026 Charles Siewert. All Rights Reserved.
  • HOME
  • PUBLICATIONS
    • Recent and Forthcoming Publications
    • Publications/Docs
  • PRESENTATIONS
  • MY RESEARCH
    • What is phenomenal consciousness?
    • The Legitimacy of Phenomenology
    • Sensory experience and intentionality
    • Phenomenal Thought
    • First-Person (“introspective”) reflection and its warrant
    • Phenomenologists (Brentano, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty)
    • Consciousness and value
    • Plato’s division of the soul: reason, appetite, spirit.
  • C.V.
  • CONTACT