Publications
1. The Significance of Consciousness
Princeton University Press, 1998.
2. Respecting Appearances
Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, edited by Dan Zahavi, Oxford University Press, 2012.
3. In Favor of (Plain) Phenomenology
In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences: Special Issue on Dennett and Heterophenomenology, Vol. 6 Nos.1-2 March 2007.
4. Who’s Afraid of Phenomenological Disputes?
In Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLV, Supplement, 2007.
5. Socratic Introspection and the Abundance of Experience
Journal of Consciousness Studies: Describing Inner Experience: a Symposium Debating Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES), Vol. 18, No. 1, January 2011.
6. Phenomenal Thought
In Cognitive Phenomenology, edited by Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague, Oxford University Press, 2011.
7. What Dennett Can’t Imagine and Why
In Inquiry 36: 96-112, March 1993.
8. Saving Appearances: a Dilemma for Physicalists
In The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, edited by George Bealer and Robert Koons, Oxford University Press, 2010.
9. Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness
Forthcoming in Phenomenal Intentionality, edited by Uriah Kriegel, Oxford University Press.
10. Consciousness and Intentionality
In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward Zalta (http://plato.stanford.edu) June 2002 (revised December 2006).
11. Consciousness, Natural Representation, and First-Person Warrant: Reply to Dretske
Psyche 10 (03), November 2004.
12. Phenomenality and Intentionality: Which Explains Which? Reply to Gertler
Psyche 10 (02), October 2004.
13. Consciousness, Intentionality, and Concepts: Reply to Nelkin
Psyche 10 (02), September 2004.
14. “First-Person Reflection and Hidden Physical Features: Reply to Witmer”
Psyche 9(06), February 2003.
15. “Eliminativism, First-Person Knowledge, and Phenomenal Intentionality: Reply to Levine”
Psyche 9(03) January 2003.
16. “Phenomenality, Intentionality, and Reflexivity: Replies to Ludwig and Thomasson”
Psyche 8(09) October 2002.
17. “Consciousness Neglect and Inner Sense: Reply to Lycan”
Psyche, 7 (07) April 2001.
18. • “Spontaneous Blindsight and Immediate Availability: Reply to Carruthers”
Psyche 7 (07) April 2001.
19. “Is the Appearance of Shape Protean?”
Psyche 12 (3) July 2006
20. “Embodied Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap”
- Symposium on Evan Thompson’s Mind in Life, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18, No. 5–6, 2011.
21. “Is Visual Experience Rich or Poor?”
In The Journal of Consciousness Studies, Special Issue: “Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?”, Vol. 9, No. 5-6, 2002.
22. “Attention and Sensorimotor Intentionality”
In Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Mind. Edited by David Smith and Amie Thomasson. Oxford University Press, 2005.
23. “Intellectualism, Experience, and Motor Understanding”
Forthcoming in Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: the McDowell/Dreyfus Debate, edited by Joseph Schear, Routledge Press.
24. “Rationality and Self-Knowledge: Shoemaker on Self-Blindness”
In Privileged Access. Edited by Brie Gertler. Ashegate, 2003.
25. “Self-Knowledge and Phenomenal Unity”
Noûs, Vol. 35, No. 4, December 2001
26. “Is Experience Transparent?”
Philosophical Studies, 117: 15-41, 2004.
27. “Attention to Experience”
Talk presented at the University of California, Riverside, January 11, 2004
28. “On the Phenomenology of Introspection”
In Introspection andConsciousness, edited by Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar, Oxford University Press, 2012.
29. “Consciousness”
In A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism. Edited by Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall. Blackwell Publishers, 2006.
30. “Phenomenological Approaches”
For The Oxford Handbook of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
31. “Philosophy of Mind”
In The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology, edited by Søren Overgaard and Sebastian Luft, Routledge Press, 2011.
32. “Plato’s Division of Reason and Appetite”
History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4, October 2001.
33. “’Spirit’ in Plato: Hearing Reason and Loving Honor”
unpublished manuscript.
