In Cognitive Phenomenology, edited by Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague, Oxford University Press, 2011.

CongitivePsyBookOxford University Press, 30 nov. 2011 - 360 pages
 
It is widely agreed that there is such a thing as sensory phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive 'cognitive phenomenology'--that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology. It also includes a number of essays which consider whether cognitive phenomenology is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.
 

Three broad themes run through the volume. First, some authors focus on the question of how the notion of cognitive phenomenology ought to be understood. How should the notion of cognitive phenomenology be defined? Are there different kinds of cognitive phenomenology? A second theme concerns the existence of cognitive phenomenology. Some contributors defend the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, whereas others deny it. The arguments for and against the existence of cognitive phenomenology raise questions concerning the nature of first-person knowledge of thought, the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, and the scope of the explanatory gap. A third theme concerns the implications of the cognitive phenomenology debate. What are the implications of the debate for accounts of our introspective access to conscious thought and for accounts of the very nature of conscious thought? Cognitive Phenomenology brings the debate to the forefront of philosophy, and provides a state-of-the-art account of the issues at stake.

 

Table of Contents

Contents

1. Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction, Michelle Montague and Tim Bayne

2. The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology, Peter Carruthers and Benedicte Veillet

3. From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed, Terry Horgan

4. Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content, Uriah Kriegel

5. On The Phenomenology of Thought, Joseph Levine

6. The Phenomenology of Particularity, Michelle Montague

7. Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content, David Pitt

8. The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology, Jesse Prinz

9. A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology, William Robinson

10. On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia, Christopher Shields

11. Phenomenal Thought, Charles Siewert

12. Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology, Maja Spener

13. Cognitive Phenomenology: real life, Galen Strawson

14. Is There a Phenomenology of Thought?, Michael Tye and Briggs Wright

15. Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking, David Woodruff-Smith

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