[Numbers in brackets are linked to entries in "Publications."]

Phenomenology, as I interpret it, consists in a sustained and unified effort to clarify our understanding of philosophically or theoretically relevant distinctions, with recourse to an underived and critical use of first-person reflection. It is in this sense that my account of consciousness is phenomenological.

In [1] (Introduction, Chapters 1-2) I argue that we have a distinctive type of warrant in first-person reflection, and can rely on this in conceptual clarification.

In [3] and [4] I defend my conception of phenomenology as a style of inquiry.

In [5] , I illustrate how my approach bears on the use of “introspective reports” in experimental research aimed at determining the content of visual experience.

My research here is closely related to that which I describe under the heading “First-Person (Introspective) Reflection and its Warrant.”